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Abstract
Investors tend to move funds when they are unhappy with their cur-
rent portfolio managers’ performance. We study the effect of the size
of this flow of funds in an agent-based model of the financial market.
The model combines the discrete choice approach from agent-based
modelling, where all capital is mobile, with the evolutionary finance
framework where all growth is endogenous. Our results show that, if
investors exhibit recency bias in evaluating portfolio managers’ perfor-
mance, even a small amount of freely flowing capital has a huge impact
on the market dynamics and the survival of noise traders. We also find
that investors’ intensity of choice is a driving force for excess volatility
and extreme price movements when the size of the flow of funds is
large.
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1 Introduction
Providers of portfolio management services chase excess returns in the asset
market as well as new money from investors. These are two closely inter-
twined goals: A portfolio manager who outperforms many of their peers
tends to see exogenous growth through the inflow of money from new and
existing clients as well as endogenous growth through returns on the capital
employed.1
The exogenous growth of investment funds through the inflow (or out-
flow) of money is at the heart of much of the agent-based literature on
financial markets, see, e.g., the textbook Hommes [26] and the surveys
Hommes [25], Chiarella et al. [14], Hommes and Wagener [28], and Let-
tau [35]. These models are populated by a small number of different in-
vestment styles and an infinite number of clients who move money between
the available styles based on differences in performance, measured, e.g., as a
weighted average of realised excess returns. To capture the impact of port-
folio managers’ performance on the reallocation of investors’ money, this
literature generally employs a discrete choice model. In the absence of bor-
rowing/lending constraints, strategies can lever their positions without limit
and, as a result, have a disproportional short-term price impact. As money
under management does not matter for a fund’s asset allocation, asset prices
are driven by the dynamic of expectations about future excess returns which
can result in excess volatility with consistent deviation of asset prices from
fundamental values.
Endogenous growth through investment returns and its consequences for
asset prices in evolutionary, agent-type finance models have been studied in
Amir et al. [1] and Evstigneev et al. [20, 21]. These models contain a small
number of portfolio managers who aim to grow funds under management
but do not face client attrition. The price impact of investors is proportional
to their funds, and there is no leveraging. A main result in that literature
is that there is only one asset price system that is stable (in the long term)
1See, e.g., the survey papers by Constantinides, Harris and Stulz [16, Chapters 14, 15,
21 and 22] and Anderson and Ahmed [2].
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against the entry of new investment styles. This benchmark price system is
given by the expected value of the discounted sum of relative asset payoffs
(a generalisation of the Kelly investment rule).
This paper combines exogenous and endogenous growth of funds in one
model. Investors can move their funds between portfolio mangers with dif-
ferent styles, but the total amount of freely flowing capital is a model pa-
rameter. There is no leveraging: the more funds a portfolio manager holds,
the stronger its price impact. By varying the size of the flow of funds in this
model, we can explore the relative importance of the two different sources
of growth for asset price dynamics.
The exogenous amount of freely flowing capital in each time period can
be interpreted as the average client’s degree of patience. If the proportion
is small, most investors keep cool heads and tend to stick with their port-
folio manager even during long periods of poor performance. On the other
hand, when this amount is large, clients have itchy feet and tend to desert
an under-performing portfolio manager quickly. There is a substantial dif-
ference between this approach to modelling the flow of funds and the usual
discrete choice formula in agent-based models of financial markets: we can
control the amount of freely flowing capital and thus the general degree of
impatience in the market by varying the level of client attrition. The dis-
crete choice formula is used however to model the destination of the free
capital. The idea of modelling non-switching and switching investors is sim-
ilar to the one of Dieci et al. [18] with the same motivation. However, their
model is based on the framework of Brock and Hommes [8, 9] where the
budget effect and the interdependence between wealth and prices are left in
the background. An exception is Bottazzi and Dindo [5] who study agents
with decision rules that can be driven by past prices.
The agent-based part of the model presented here is most closely related
to that part of this literature that forbids short-selling: Anufriev and Dindo
[3], LeBaron [30, 31, 32, 33] and Levy, Levy and Solomon [36, 37, 38, 39]. In
these papers the budget constraint limits the potential market impact of the
different investment styles. This is in contrast to the models where unlimited
positions are possible (e.g. Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini [13] and Brianzoni,
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Mammana and Michetti [7]) and those where asset prices are driven only
by funds’ expectations about future returns (e.g. Brock and Hommes [8, 9],
Gaunersdorfer and Hommes [23]).
The evolutionary finance part of the model extends Evstigneev et al. [22]
by adding an explicit mechanism that reallocates a certain proportion of
funds between the different portfolio managers. In these models leverage is
excluded and therefore the available budget constrains the positions that a
fund manager can take on as well as their market impact. The hybrid model
presented here bridges the gap between the agent-based and the evolutionary
approach. It can be used as a powerful tool to obtain insightful results
regarding the feedback loop between the exogenous flow of funds with budget
effect, the endogenous growth of wealth, and the price dynamics.
Our paper is also closely related to inquires into the interaction of passive
and active learning dynamics, as defined in LeBaron [34]. Passive learn-
ing refers to the market force by which wealth accumulates on investment
strategies which have done well (in relative terms). Active learning refers to
the switching behaviour by which investors reallocate wealth into strategies
which have performed well in the past. As LeBaron points out, although
both learning types and their consequences on the price dynamics have been
extensively studied in isolation, the interaction between the two remains
largely unexplored.
We are particularly interested in the impact of the size of the flow of
funds on systematic deviations of prices from fundamental values as well
as on excess volatility. This inquiry has both theoretical as well as practi-
cal aspects. Under the discrete choice model, all capital is ready to move
at any time. In evolutionary finance models, all funds stay with the same
portfolio manager. In reality however clients’ behaviour fits neither descrip-
tion. Investors do not continuously monitor the performance of all portfolio
managers and move funds at all times, nor do they ignore performance and
never switch to managers with superior performance. As stressed by Dieci
et al. ([18], p. 520): “Empirical evidence has suggested that, facing different
trading strategies and complicated decision, the proportions of agents relying
on particular strategies may stay at constant level or vary over time.”.
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Since our model separates the clients’ allocation decision from the amount
of freely flowing capital, we look more closely into the relation between be-
havioural aspects, such as differences of opinions, recency bias in perfor-
mance evaluation, conservatism bias (e.g., Edwards [19]) and rational herd-
ing, and the model parameters. We also explore the impact of some of these
behavioural phenomena on the asset price dynamics.
The next section introduces the general framework of the hybrid model
and provides a specification with three investment styles. The detailed nu-
merical study of the model is provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
All proofs are collected in an appendix. The software and data are available
at www.schenk-hoppe.net/software/flow-of-funds/.
2 Model
2.1 General framework
We consider a financial market in which K ≥ 1 risky assets and one risk-
free asset are traded at discrete points in time t = 0, 1, .... Risky assets
k = 1, ...,K pay dividends Dt,k ≥ 0. (Dt,1, ..., Dt,K) is a stationary stochas-
tic process with
∑K
k=1 Dt,k > 0 and EDt,k ≡ D¯k < ∞. Risky assets are in
constant positive supply, normalised to 1, and their prices Pt,k will be deter-
mined through short-run equilibrium of supply and demand. The risk-free
asset k = 0 has a constant price Pt,0 = 1 and pays a constant interest r > 0
per period.
There are I ≥ 1 portfolio managers (funds) in the market which manage
wealth on behalf of their clients. The portfolio held by fund i at time t is
denoted by a vector θit = (θ
i
t,0, θ
i
t,1, ..., θ
i
t,K) representing the number of units
of each asset. The quantity θit,k is given by
θit,k = (1− c)
λit,kW
i
t
Pt,k
, k = 0, 1, ...,K, (1)
where W it is the wealth managed by fund i at time t, 1 − c ∈ (0, 1) is the
fraction of wealth reinvested in every period (the remainder is, e.g., used
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for management fees or clients’ consumption), and λit = (λ
i
t,0, ..., λ
i
t,K) is
a vector of investment proportions with λit,k ≥ 0 and
∑K
k=0 λ
i
t,k = 1. We
assume that λit can depend on past observations of dividends, asset prices
and investment strategies up to time t−1. These strategies can also exhibit
additional, inherent randomness as long as it is independent from dividends
and other strategies at times t, t+ 1, ....
The value of fund i’s holdings at the end of investment period [t, t + 1)
is equal to
V it+1 =
K∑
k=1
[Pt+1,k +Dt+1,k]θ
i
t,k + (1 + r)θ
i
t,0. (2)
Equation (2) describes the endogenous change in an investment fund’s wealth,
i.e., the gains or losses of a fund’s wealth due to the asset returns.
The exogenous change of wealth under management is caused by clients
moving investments between the different funds at the end of each period.
The decision to reallocate investments is driven by observed performance of
funds. We assume that each time period a fraction β ∈ [0, 1] of all invest-
ments is allocated according to some performance measure. The remaining
fraction 1− β stays with the fund where it is currently invested. Formally,
W it+1 = (1− β)V
i
t+1 + q
i
tβV¯t+1, (3)
where V¯t+1 =
∑I
i=1 V
i
t+1 is the aggregate wealth under management of all
funds and qit, i = 1, ..., I, are proportions (q
i
t ≥ 0,
∑
i q
i
t = 1) that depend on
the funds’ performance up to time t. Equation (3) says that, after clients’
completed their reallocation of funds, the actual wealth W it+1 managed by
an investment fund i at the beginning of the period [t+1, t+2), consists of
two parts: the wealth that stays with this fund, (1− β)V it+1, and the (new)
wealth received by this fund, qitβV¯t+1. The value of W
i
t+1 is the budget of
fund i which is available for investment at time t + 1. The parameter β
allows to control the maximum amount of capital that can flow between the
funds. In contrast to other agent-based models, for each $1 of wealth, only
$β will be reallocated.
If clients cannot move investments between funds (β = 0), equation (3)
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implies that each fund’s budget W it+1 is equal to the value V
i
t+1 of its time
t+1 holdings. Then wealth under management can only grow endogenously.
If clients can move investments between funds (β > 0), the actual budget
W it+1 is affected by the exogenous flows of wealth. Depending on the sign
of W it+1 − V
i
t+1, the net inflow or outflow of wealth into a fund i is given by
β
(
qitV¯t+1 − V
i
t+1
)
.
Market clearing for each risky asset requires
∑I
i=1 θ
i
t,k = 1, k = 1, ...K,
which is equivalent to
Pt,k = (1− c)
I∑
i=1
λit,kW
i
t . (4)
Since the price of the risk-free asset is 1, θit,0 = (1 − c)λ
i
t,0W
i
t is equal to
the amount invested in that asset. With specification (3), we can write the
dynamic of wealth under management as
V it+1 =
K∑
k=1
λit,k[(1− β)V
i
t + βq
i
t−1V¯t]
〈λt,k, (1− β)Vt + βqt−1V¯t〉
×
(
(1− c)
[
(1− β)〈λt+1,k, Vt+1〉+ β〈λt+1,k, qt〉V¯t+1
]
+Dt+1,k
)
+(1 + r)(1− c)λit,0
[
(1− β)V it + βq
i
t−1V¯t
]
,
with i = 1, ..., I, where 〈x, y〉 =
∑
i xiyi denotes the scalar product, and
(dropping the time index) V = (V 1, ..., V I)T ∈ RI+, λk = (λ
1
k, ..., λ
I
k)
T ∈ RI+,
and q = (q1, ..., qI)T ∈ RI+ with R+ denotes the set of non-negative real
numbers. Equivalently, using vector notation,
Vt+1 = Θt
[
(1− c)
[
(1− β)Λt+1 + βΛt+1qt1
]
Vt+1 +Dt+1
]
+(1 + r)(1− c)∆λt,0
[
(1− β)Vt + βqt−11Vt
]
, (5)
where Λ = (λik) ∈ R
K×I
+ , 1 = (1, ..., 1) ∈ R
I , D = (D1, ..., DK)
T ∈ RK+ , and
∆λ0 ∈ R
I×I
+ has entries λ
i
0 on the diagonal and zero otherwise. Denoting
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Wt = (W
1
t , ...,W
I
t )
T ∈ RI+, the portfolio matrix Θ ∈ R
I×K
+ is given by
Θik =
ΛkiW
i
(ΛW )k
=
Λki[(1− β)V
i + βqiV¯ ][
Λ
(
(1− β)V + βq1V
)]
k
.
Conditions ensuring that the dynamic (5) is well-defined are provided
in the following result which is proved in Appendix A. Here RI++ = {a ∈
[0,∞)I :
∑I
i=1 ai > 0} denotes the set of non-zero vectors with non-negative
coordinates.
Proposition 2.1. For any Vt ∈ R
I
++, there is a unique Vt+1 ∈ R
I
++ solving
(5) provided there is at least one fund i with V it > 0, which is fully diversified
in risky assets, i.e., λit,k > 0 and λ
i
t+1,k > 0 for all k ≥ 1. If β = 1 it is
further required that qit > 0.
The proof of this result also yields an explicit expression of the dynamic:
Vt+1 =
[
Id− (1− c)Θt
(
(1− β)Λt+1 + βΛt+1qt1
)]−1
×[
ΘtDt+1 + (1 + r)(1− c)∆λt,0
[
(1− β)Vt + βqt−11Vt
]]
(6)
with Id the I-dimensional identity matrix.2 Using this result, each fund’s
budget W it+1 can be computed by inserting (6) into the specification (3).
2.2 Benchmark
Assume there is one risky and one risk-free asset, and a single portfolio
manager. Then the dynamic (6) reduces to
Vt+1 =
Dt+1 + (1 + r)(1− c)λt,0Vt
1− (1− c)λt+1,1
(7)
and the risky asset’s price is
Pt+1 = (1− c)λt+1,1Vt+1. (8)
2Setting β = 0 in (6), one obtains the dynamic studied in Evstigneev et al. [22].
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One therefore finds the recursive equation
Pt+1 =
(1− c)λt+1,1
1− (1− c)λt+1,1
[
Dt+1 + (1 + r)
1− λt,1
λt,1
Pt
]
. (9)
Let the dividend (Dt) be a stationary process with a finite variance.
Then we have the following result (its proof is given in Appendix A):
Proposition 2.2. Let c ≥ r/(1 + r) and assume that λt,1 ≡ λ ∈ (0, 1] is a
constant and σ2 = V ar(D0) <∞.
(i) The process
P ∗t = b
0∑
n=−∞
a−nDt+n (10)
with
a = (1 + r)
(1− c)(1− λ)
1− (1− c)λ
, b =
(1− c)λ
1− (1− c)λ
(11)
is a stationary solution to the dynamics (9).
(ii) For each P0 ≥ 0, the price process Pt converges a.s. to the path (P
∗
t )
in the following sense
lim
t→∞ |Pt − P
∗
t | = 0 a.s.
(iii) The expectation and variance of the stationary solution are as fol-
lows
EP ∗t =
b
1− a
ED0 =
b
1− a
D¯, V ar(P ∗t ) =
b2σ2
1− a2
.
Interpretation. Suppose c = r/(1 + r). Then the above result shows
that the price of the risky asset converges to a stationary process (P ∗t ).
Moreover the expectation of this process is equal to the fundamental value:
E(P ∗t ) =
D¯
r
. (12)
This result holds regardless of the portfolio manager’s investment strategy
λ as long as it is a constant. The volatility of the price process (P ∗t ) however
9
depends on the specific strategy. For c = r/(1 + r), one finds that
V ar(P ∗t ) =
σ2λ/r
r + (2 + r)(1− λ)
.
In the particular case σ = 0, the price process becomes deterministic. Then
the condition c = r/(1 + r) implies that the fundamental value is a unique
fixed point of the price process.
To have the fundamental value as an equilibrium benchmark, we set
c = r/(1 + r) throughout the remainder of the paper.
2.3 Model specification
We focus on the model with one risky and one risk-free asset. The investment
proportion for the risky asset can then be expressed by a single number
λt ∈ [0, 1]. Given λ
i
t, fund i invests according to (1 − λ
i
t, λ
i
t). We assume
that dividends are i.i.d. with truncated normal distribution N (µ, σ)+, see
Appendix B for details on the implementation.
Investment strategies of portfolio managers. We consider three
investment strategies, each followed by one portfolio manager: fundamental,
trend-following and noise trading. These investment styles are the most
commonly studied in the heterogeneous agent-based literature, see, e.g.,
Hommes [25, 26]. All three strategies are based on subjective forecasts
of expected cum-dividend excess returns. For each investment style, the
forecast Fˆt of the excess return of risky over the risk-free asset between the
current and the next period is computed as follows.
The fundamental fund forecasts price reversal to the fundamental value:
FˆFt =
D¯/r + D¯ − Pt−1
Pt−1
− r =
[
D¯/r
Pt−1
− 1
]
(1 + r).
Here D¯ is the expected dividend payment, and D¯/r the risky asset’s funda-
mental value.
The trend-chasing fund interpolates the trend observed in the last L
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periods to forecast future excess return:
Fˆ Tt = (1/L)
L∑
j=1
Pt−j +Dt−j − Pt−1−j
Pt−1−j
− r.
The noise-trader fund makes randomly revised forecasts according to an
AR(1) process:
FˆNt = δFˆ
N
t−1 + ǫξt, ξt ∼ N(0, 1) (13)
with constants δ ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ > 0.
Given a forecast Fˆt, the demand of each fund at time t is determined
by a demand function that maps Fˆt into an investment proportion λt. To
ensure the dynamics of funds’ wealth is well-defined (Proposition 2.1), the
value of λt has to be bounded by zero and one, i.e., there is no leverage or
short-selling. On the other hand, we want agents’ portfolio decision to be
proportional to changes in their forecasts.
A natural candidate for the demand function is a symmetric S-shaped
smooth function whose values are in the interval (0, 1) and where the slope
at zero is controlled by a parameter. Similar to Lebaron [29, 30, 31] and
Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini [12, 13], we adopt a sigmoid demand function
to determine the investment proportions of each fund type with respect to
their forecasts of excess returns.3 The value of λt is given by
4
λt = (1/π) arctan(αFˆt) + 1/2. (14)
The investment proportions in the risk-free and the risky asset are given
by (1 − λt, λt). The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) describes how strongly the fund
reacts to perceived future excess return. Formula (14) guarantees that for
3LeBaron argues that, in a model with heterogenous agents, deriving optimal demand
from utility maximisation requires an agent to be informed about the states of other agents
which is unrealistic. Agents’ demand is therefore modeled with a simple rule based on
a sigmoid function. Chiarella et al. use sigmoid functions to capture agents’ demand to
capture expectations of an increase in market risk when the absolute value of expected
excess return rises, e.g., during periods of booms or crashes.
4The trigonometric function arctan takes values in (−pi/2,+pi/2). Hence dividing by
pi and adding 1/2 gives values between 0 and 1.
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any forecast the fund takes long positions in both risk-free and risky asset
because λt ∈ (0, 1). The S-shaped demand curve captures a simple but
general heuristic in investment — investors tend to increase (or decrease)
diminishingly their investments in the risky asset along with the increase
(or decrease) in perceived future excess return. Different to models where
investment proportions are derived from utility maximisation (e.g. Levy,
Levy, and Solomon [39] and Chiarella and He [15]) with a purpose to char-
acterise agents’ optimal behaviour, the demand function (14) used here is to
facilitate behaviourally the modelling of the three typical investment styles
mentioned above5.
Flow of clients’ money. We follow Brock and Hommes [9] in assum-
ing that investors reallocate the wealth that is withdrawn from funds in
proportions
qit =
exp(γf it )
I∑
j=1
exp(γf jt )
, (15)
where f it is the sum of discounted realised log returns of fund i:
f it = log(φ
i
t) + ρf
i
t−1 (16)
with
φit =
V it
(1− c)W it−1
. (17)
Here φit is fund i’s realised return between period t− 1 and t, and ρ ∈ [0, 1]
is the discounting factor. The parameter γ ≥ 0 measures clients’ sensitivity
5Levy, Levy, and Solomon [39] and Chiarella and He [15] may represent two typical ap-
proaches for solving investment proportions via maximising CRRA type utility functions
in agent-based models. Both approaches require ad-hoc assumptions to restrict invest-
ment proportions between zero and one. The former solves investment proportions and
the market clearing price simultaneously by a numerical search procedure. This method is
equivalently to assume that each agent in the market knows others’ investment strategies
so that all agents are able to compute the current market clearing price. The latter de-
rives investment proportions based on a closed-form solution to utility maximisation with
particular assumptions on the wealth dynamics. The resulting investment proportions
depend linearly on expected excess returns. A negative expected excess return will cause
agents to withdraw immediately all investments from the risky asset regardless of their
previous positions.
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to differences in observed performance of portfolio managers.
A key feature of (15) is the heterogeneity of clients’ choices. For every
parameter value γ ∈ [0,∞), some positive (gross) amount of wealth flows
to each investment fund. But the actual net flow is dependent on all funds’
performances. A crucial issue for the model dynamics is therefore which
condition implies an increase or decrease in the proportion qi of a fund i
between time t and t+ 1. A short discussion of this neglected issue follows.
Let us look at the sign function sgn(qit+1−q
i
t) where a positive (negative)
sign of qit+1 − q
i
t refers to a net increase (decrease) of wealth. Define the
improvement of an investment fund’s strategy i = 1, ..., I during a time
interval [t, t+ 1] as:
∆it+1 = f
i
t+1 − f
i
t ,
and the average improvement of all investment funds’ strategies during the
time interval [t, t+ 1] as:
∆¯t+1 =
1
I
I∑
i=1
∆it+1.
The condition which triggers the increase or decrease in qi can be char-
acterised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. For each investment fund’s strategy i = 1, ..., I, the sign
of qit+1 − q
i
t is determined by the sign of ∆
i
t+1 − ∆¯t+1:
sgn(qit+1 − q
i
t) = sgn(∆
i
t+1 − ∆¯t+1).
This result shows that clients have a tendency to choose funds whose im-
provements are higher than the average level. Note that a fund j which has
the highest performance measure f jt+1 at time t+1 does not necessarily have
a higher improvement ∆jt+1 than the average level. The ‘best performed’
fund type j may lose clients at time t+ 1 if its improvement ∆jt+1 falls be-
low the average. Such a property reveals that clients with itchy feet hold
a different interpretation for the performance measure: the improvement of
13
an investment fund. Itchy-feet clients are sensitive to the improvements of
funds and thus liable to overreact to changes in performance when choosing
between funds.
Proposition 2.3 further provides insights into the difference between the
two widely studied type-switching mechanisms: The discrete choice ap-
proach as described by equation (15) and the replicator dynamics used in
evolutionary game theory. Branch and McGough [6] apply the later in the
framework of Brock and Hommes [8]. They find that the replicator dynamics
implies that the proportion qit for agents who choose a predictor i at time t
will increase (decrease) at time t+1 if the value of predictor i’s performance
measure is higher (lower) than the value of the average performance measure
across all available predictors. Therefore, under the replicator dynamics, the
use of some predictors will cease over time. But according to Proposition 2.3
under the discrete choice approach, agents’ choice of predictors is sensitive
to the improvement in predictors’ performance measures rather than the dif-
ference between predictors’ performance measures. Hence even predictors
that are dominated can survive if their performance is volatile enough.
2.4 Discussion of behavioural aspects
Clients’ psychology may play an important role in the choice of investment
funds, especially when clients are boundedly rational. By linking to the
behavioural finance literature, we explain and discuss some psychological
elements and behavioural phenomena which are covered by the model.
Differences of opinion. The foundation for the switching mechanism
(15) is the randomized discrete choice framework of McFadden [41], whereas
Brock and Hommes [8, 9] utilised it in dynamic equilibrium models of finan-
cial markets to study the adaptation of investors. In discrete choice studies,
not all agents necessarily choose the option, here the investment fund, which
is indicated (by the model) to have the highest performance measure. Such a
phenomenon corresponds to the case of γ ∈ [0,∞) in (15). The finite value
of γ implies that agents are heterogeneous in making choices of available
options. The reason for such heterogeneity of agents is explained by McFad-
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den [41] as unmodeled idiosyncratic components in agents’ utility function or
randomness in agents’ preferences, while Brock and Hommes [8, 9] attribute
this heterogeneity to agents’ bounded rationality.
Our model characterises various types of differences of opinion among
investors. First, the differences in prior beliefs is modelled by the set of
different fund types. The presence of cool-head investors may reinforce this
type of differences of opinion. Second, the switching mechanism (15) with
γ ∈ [0,∞) is able to capture the differences of opinion in fund selection and
the phenomenon that clients hold different interpretations of the public per-
formance measure (16) of each fund type. When γ ∈ [0,∞), each itchy-feet
investor can be thought as having a private measurement or interpretation
for the performance of each strategy. As revealed by Proposition 2.3, the
improvement of strategy ∆it = f
i
t − f
i
t−1 can be regarded as an example
of this kind of private measurement or interpretation for the performance
of each strategy. This may lead to the phenomenon that some itchy-feet
investors choose fund types according to the value of public performance
measure, i.e., the value of f it , while some may make their choices based on
the value of improvement of each fund type, i.e., the value of ∆it.
In this switching mechanism, the distribution of clients’ investments
among different fund types becomes more (or less) diversified when the value
of γ becomes low (or high). For this reason, the degree of differences of opin-
ion among investors in strategy selection can be measured by the value of
γ ∈ [0,∞). A lower (or higher) value of γ corresponds to a higher (or lower)
degree of differences of opinion.
Conservatism bias and rational herding. Different degrees of dif-
ferences of opinion in strategy-switching may represent different behavioural
phenomena, such as conservatism bias and rational herding. Edwards [19]
identified the phenomenon of conservatism which describes that people re-
act conservatively to new information, and they are slow to change an es-
tablished view. In the context of performance-driven fund flows, a micro
level foundation for conservatism is that switching investors tend to be less
sensitive to the evidence of the performance of each strategy. A resulting
manifestation on the macro level is that the average amount of the net flows
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of wealth is low. Such a phenomenon can be captured when the value of γ
is low.6
Rational herding refers to the tendency that investors to react to infor-
mation about the behaviour of other investors. According to Bruce [11],
rational herding happens because some investors believe others can perform
better than themselves, therefore they follow or mimic others’ behaviour.
Such a phenomenon can be captured when the value of γ is high, since
a high value of γ implies that investors are less conservative and a large
proportion of investors will switch fast to the best performing investment
strategy.
In our model, the market impact of the differences of opinion in strategy
selection and its related behavioural phenomena can be studied by exploring
how different values of γ in (15) affects the market dynamics.
Recency bias. This cognitive bias is related to the way that individ-
uals digest information. Recency bias refers to the tendency of individuals
to assign more importance to more recent information compared to those
farther in the past. In the behavioural finance literature, recency bias have
been widely studied in relation to asset valuation and evaluation of funds’
performance. For example, as stated in Pompian ([43], p. 216): “one of
the most obvious and most pernicious manifestation of recency bias among
investors pertains to their misuse of investment performance records for mu-
tual funds and other types of funds. Investors track managers who produce
temporary outsized returns during a one-, two-, or three-year period and
make investment decisions based on such recent experience”.
In our model, recency bias in performance evaluation is captured through
the parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1) in (16). Decreasing the value of ρ represents an
increase in the degree of recency bias. In the extreme case ρ = 0, the
6In each time period, the intensity of the actual flow of wealth between investment
strategies is controlled by the value of γ, while the value of β governs the proportion of
the total amount of wealth that is potentially to flow. We refer to conservatism as a
behavioural attribute of itchy-feet investors, as in our model cool-head investors do not
look at the performance of each fund type and their wealth does not participate in the
flow-of-funds. The presence of cool-head investors can be regarded as a form of rational
inattention (e.g. Sims [45]), sticky-information (e.g. Mankiw and Reis [40]), or status quo
bias (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser [44]) in agents’ decision-making.
16
performance of each fund is assessed by its most recent realised return. In
contrast, the case ρ = 1 describes clients who have an infinite memory and
are unbiased in performance evaluation. This setting allows us to explore
how investors’ recency bias in performance evaluation affects the market
dynamics.
3 Simulation results
Our numerical analysis of the model focuses on the impact of the flow of
clients’ funds. We explore the effect of the proportion (β) of the total wealth
that is allocated according to observed performance of funds. We also study
the impact of the degree of the recency bias (ρ) in measuring performance
and the role of the intensity of choice (γ).
Table 1 collects the parameter values used in the numerical simulations.
Each time period in the simulation corresponds to a week in real time.
Parameter Value Explanation
r 0.001 Interest rate per week (5.3% p.a.)
c r/(1 + r) Consumption rate
Dt N (µ, σ)
+ Dividend i.i.d. random variable
D¯ 1 Mean of dividend process
σ 0.2 Standard deviation of dividend process
L 30 Observation horizon trend-chasing fund
αL L Scaling parameter trend-chasing fund
αF 0.25 Scaling parameter fundamental fund
δ 0.97 Discounting for noise trader fund
ǫ 0.2 Standard deviation for noise trader fund
β {0, 10−8, 10−7, ..., 1} Proportion of freely flowing wealth
γ {1, 2, ..., 10} Intensity of choice
ρ {0.99, 1} Discount rate of observations
Table 1: Parameters and their values
Initial conditions. To ensure a level playing field, the value of each
fund’s performance measure is set to 0 at the initial time t = 0. Aggregate
initial wealth is set to 2,000 and is equally distributed across the three
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funds. To be able to determine the three fund’s investment strategies at the
initial time, we define L observations of the price and dividend for the time
periods t = −L, ...,−1. These data provide an upward trend in the price
with a constant growth rate 0.0015 per period in order to initialise the trend
following behaviour.7 The L dividends are set to their expected value. The
first period where the flow of funds can occur is from time t = 1 to t = 2,
i.e., after the first actual realisation of the performance measure.
3.1 Size of flow of funds
We first explore the effects of the size of the flow of clients’ funds. This
proportion is given by the value of the parameter β which determines the
proportion of the total wealth that is allocated according to funds’ perfor-
mance in any given period of time. In the extreme situation β = 0 all
funds’ growth is purely driven by returns on their investments (the evolu-
tionary finance case where all clients keep a cool head). As the value of β
increases, more capital is ready to move in any period which entail higher
growth rates of wealth under management of better performing funds. Un-
derperforming funds on the other hand will lose investment wealth faster.
The other extreme is β = 1 where all capital is ready to move and funds’
superior performance attracts an inflow of new capital (the agent-based case
where all clients have itchy feet).
3.1.1 No recency bias
Table 2 collects data on the long-run averages of wealth under management
by the three different funds, trading volume, excess return and standard
deviation of the price and excess return. Clients have no recency bias and
weigh all observations equally, i.e., the discount rate applied is ρ = 1.
All quantities in the table are calculated from 10 independent runs of
the model by averaging over N = 1 million time periods after an initial
(discarded) 900,000 time periods. Trading volume per time step is calculated
7These data will not affect the results as the predefined pattern in the price will be
fully cleared by the randomness of the model after L periods from t = 0.
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as Volt =
∑I
i=1 |θ
i
t − θ
i
t−1|/2. Excess return per time period is given by
ln(Pt+Dt
Pt−1
)− ln(1 + r). Table 2 reports annualised values.
β
Funds’ wealth (in %)
Std. dev Std. dev Volume Excess ret.
Noise Fund. Trend Price Excess ret. (in %) (in %)
0 0.0505 75.09 24.86 4.4815 0.003137 0.402 0.000418
1E-8 .0199 73.96 26.02 4.4959 0.003157 0.415 -0.000711
1E-7 .0193 77.16 22.82 4.3256 0.003087 0.374 0.000178
1E-6 .0122 84.04 15.95 4.3520 0.003046 0.300 -0.000271
1E-5 .0006 89.52 10.48 4.3583 0.002913 0.206 -0.000051
1‱ 0.0151 86.28 13.71 4.3137 0.002956 0.250 0.000478
1‰ 0.0237 79.41 20.57 4.4111 0.003106 0.362 -0.000332
1% 0.0256 75.82 24.15 4.4101 0.003083 0.348 0.000108
10% 0.0251 74.73 25.24 4.4924 0.003087 0.347 -0.000488
100% 0.0246 75.70 24.28 4.3697 0.003082 0.350 0.000308
Table 2: Market characteristics for different proportions of free flow of funds
(β). Intensity of choice is set to γ = 2. Clients have no recency bias, i.e.,
ρ = 1.
The results in Table 2, columns 1-4, show the average amounts of wealth
under management by the three funds for different values of β. The noise
trader fund holds less than 0.0256% of the total wealth under management,
the fundamental fund has about three-quarters, and the trend-chasing fund
about one-quarter. The noise trader fund therefore has a negligible impact
on the price. Among the two large funds, fundamental investment domi-
nates. Since the trading volume per period is extremely low (column 7), it
follows that both funds essentially hold identical portfolios.
As a consequence of the fact that almost all wealth is held in portfolios
invested according to fundamental values, the price of the risky asset is
very close to the fundamental value (columns 5-6). The excess returns are
almost zero and the volatility of the price is close to its benchmark value
σ∗ = 4.4688 (see Proposition 2.2).
These findings hold true for all values of β. These scenarios range from
no freely flowing capital (β = 0) to all wealth being allocated according to
performance in each period (β = 1). In all of these markets, pricing is in
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line with fundamentals, there is almost no excess volatility, and the noise
trader fund plays a negligible role. We can draw the following conclusion. If
clients have no recency bias (ρ = 1) then the market prices assets according
to fundamental values for all proportions β of freely flowing capital.
3.1.2 Recency bias
We repeat the above exercise but assume that clients exhibit a mild recency
bias by setting ρ = 0.99. Clients discount the realised performance of all
funds, hence place greater weight on more recent observations. In the current
case, the last observation (L = 30) is weighted by a factor of about 74%.
We therefore refer to this scenario as mild recency bias.
Table 3 collects the simulation results. The first observation is that
recency bias has a pronounced effect on the market dynamics. Compared to
Table 2, all but the first row (where the value of ρ is irrelevant as no capital
moves) contain different numbers in Table 3. The fundamental value fund is
the largest throughout but both the trend chasing fund and, in particular,
the noise trader fund increase their wealth under management when β is
larger.
β
Funds’ wealth (in %)
Std. dev Std. dev Volume Excess ret.
Noise Fund. Trend Price Excess ret. (in %) (in %)
0 .0505 75.09 24.86 4.4815 0.003137 0.402 0.000418
1‱ 7.42 63.89 28.69 62.163 0.113713 32.20 0.020348
1‰ 18.05 51.89 30.06 161.88 0.283485 71.03 0.130028
1% 26.62 41.88 31.50 253.23 0.429098 95.70 0.327618
10% 28.37 39.80 31.86 277.10 0.457822 99.56 0.382398
100% 28.84 39.51 31.65 285.83 0.459898 102.79 0.417128
Table 3: Market characteristics for different proportions of free flow of funds
(β). Intensity of choice is set to γ = 2. Clients exhibit a mild recency bias
with ρ = 0.99.
There is excess return in all scenarios where some capital can move (β >
0) and the risky asset’s price is much more volatile than the fundamental
value. The market adds price risk and a risk premium. We also observe a
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considerable trading volume.
Even with a small amount of wealth being allocated according to fund
performance, the noise trader fund plays a substantial role. For instance,
for β = 1‱ the fund on average manages more than 7.4% of all wealth (up
from 0.0151%), which turns out to have a strong impact on price volatility
of the risky asset and trading volume. The standard deviation of the price
increases by an order of magnitude and trading volume increases by a factor
of more than 100.
The larger the value of β, the more pronounced these effects. However,
the increase in the noise trader fund’s wealth, price volatility and trading
volume is strongest for values of β up to 1%. A further increase from 1%
up to 100% of capital being reallocated according to performance has a
comparatively minor impact.
At the maximum level β = 100%, the fundamental value fund manages
less than 40% while the two other funds are roughly of equal size with each
having about 30% of wealth under management. The risk premium (0.417)
is about a thousand times higher than in the case β = 0.
While in the rational market observed in the absence of recency bias
(ρ = 1) was accompanied by a negligible amount of noise trading, the recency
bias creates a tremendous room for the noise trader fund. With a wealth
of 28.84% of the total, the noise trading fund has substantial price impact.
Analogously to the noise trader literature (De Long et al. [17]), one can
conclude that the noise trader fund ‘creates its own space’.
We can draw the following conclusion. Clients’ recency bias, even a mild
one, when combined with small fraction of freely moving capital, can have
a tremendous impact on the price and market dynamics. Noise trading and
trend chasing both are investment styles that are viable over the long term.
The agent-based literature mostly focuses on the case where individ-
ual investors use only the most recent realised return or profit to evaluate
the performance of each investment strategy (i.e., ρ = 0). How investors’
memory biases (such as the recency bias and short memory) in evaluating
and selecting investment strategies can impact the market dynamics has re-
ceived less attention. LeBaron [31, 33] studies the role of investors’ memory
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lengths in strategy evaluation using an agent-based model where the strat-
egy selection mechanism is mainly driven by the discrete choice model as
described by (15). Similar to the model presented here, that model forbids
short-selling and allows the impact of wealth on the price.
LeBaron shows that in a market where investors have heterogeneous
memory lengths in evaluating the performance of each strategy the pres-
ence of investors who exhibit “small sample bias” (short memory length)
increases the market volatility in the long term. The volatility becomes
smaller if more investors with long memory lengths are present in the mar-
ket. Furthermore, it has been reported that if all investors have sufficient
long memory lengths (greater than 28 years) when come to evaluate the per-
formance of each strategy, the price may converge to a rational benchmark
(e.g. the fundamental value).
By comparing our results with those reported by LeBaron [31, 33], the
following important consensus can be reached. First and foremost, the cog-
nitive bias in investors’ memory plays a crucial role in affecting strategy eval-
uation and selection, which may yield a substantial impact on the long-term
market dynamics. Second, the “long memory” of investors in evaluating
and selecting investment strategies tends to stabilise the market in the long
term. Third, recency and small sample bias both point to the conjecture
that investors with relatively short memory in strategy selection may desta-
bilise the market. These “short memory” investors create an evolutionary
space where different investment strategies are able to thrive. Not just those
strategies with good cumulative performance, even those with relatively bad
cumulative performance are viable. As stressed by LeBaron ([31], p. 7206):
“these results contrast sharply with the commonly held wisdom in finance
that “bad” strategies will eventually be driven out of the market”.
However, the situation and result can be quite different in models where
unlimited positions are possible and asset prices are driven only by investors’
expectations about future returns. Hommes [10], for instance, shows that
an increase in memory length, i.e., a larger value of the parameter ρ, of
all investors in strategy evaluation and selection tends to destabilise the
market. Hommes et al. [27] further report that whether memory stabilises
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or destabilises may critically depend on how past performances are weighted.
Changing the weights may reverse the result, that is, an increase in memory
may also stabilise the market.8 Although different conclusions are drawn
in different market contexts, these results reveal that investors’ memory
in evaluating and selecting strategies is a critical behavioural element in
shaping the long term dynamics.
3.2 Intensity of choice
The above results show that all three funds can co-exist in the long run,
provided clients exhibit at least some degree of recency bias. We now turn
to the question whether a higher intensity of choice is to the advantage or
disadvantage of either the noise trading or the trend chasing fund.
The intensity of choice, which is set by the parameter γ, determines
how strongly clients react to differences in fund performance. The higher
the value of γ, the more of the freely flowing capital will go to the better
performing funds. If γ is low, the time average of a fund’s performance
matters more than its volatility. If γ is high, variance in performance carries
a higher penalty in competition for clients’ wealth.
A key feature of the switching mechanism is that, if the value of the
intensity of choice parameter γ is finite, not all clients necessarily choose
the fund type which is indicated (by the model) to have the highest per-
formance measure. Clients may hold different opinions in selecting fund
types. Furthermore, clients under this switching mechanism may have dif-
ferent interpretations of the public performance measure of each fund type
(see Proposition 2.3). The degree of differences of opinion in type-switching
can be measured by the value of parameter γ. Clients’ conservatism bias
and herding type of behaviour are associated with the degree of differences
of opinion in type-switching. Clients’ conservative or herding type of be-
haviour can be observed when the value of γ is relatively low or high. We
8Hommes et al. [27] show that an increase in memory stabilises the market if the
normalisation of performance measure changed to: (1 − ρ)Xit + ρY
i
t−1 where ρ ∈ [0, 1),
Xit is the profit strategy i at time t, and Y
i
t−1 is the performance measure of strategy i at
time t− 1.
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investigate how different values of γ impact the market dynamics.
To demonstrate the effect of a higher intensity of choice when clients
exhibit recency bias (ρ = 0.99) we consider 10 scenarios with parameter
values γ = 1, 2, ..., 10. Table 4 summarises the market characteristics of
these scenarios.
γ
Funds’ wealth (in %)
Std. dev Std. dev Volume Excess ret.
Noise Fund. Trend Price Excess ret. (in %) (in %)
1 30.75 36.75 32.50 303.061 0.492027 106.19 0.519018
2 28.83 39.44 31.73 285.309 0.455402 102.04 0.410298
3 27.18 41.91 30.91 269.53 0.434343 100.95 0.345498
4 25.77 43.68 30.55 277.981 0.408359 99.31 0.368258
5 24.82 45.73 29.45 281.61 0.399342 100.77 0.332078
6 23.68 47.76 28.56 302.576 0.392855 101.57 0.408968
7 22.84 50.46 26.70 353.622 0.402047 104.03 0.513918
8 22.02 53.38 24.61 387.082 0.422043 105.50 0.560178
9 21.01 56.46 22.52 435.641 0.443613 105.23 0.675598
10 21.02 58.66 20.32 455.214 0.454744 108.04 0.699088
Table 4: Market characteristics for different values of intensity of choice γ.
Clients exhibit a mild recency bias, ρ = 0.99. β = 1.
The results on the long-run average of wealth under management for the
three funds in Table 4 are interesting. More performance-sensitive clients
benefit investment in fundamentals. When the intensity of choice is very low,
the three funds are of roughly equal size. With an increasing intensity of
choice, the fundamental value fund increases in size at the expense of the two
other funds which are affected almost equally. However, these are average
proportions of wealth under management. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 show
that the short-term dynamics gets more volatile when the intensity of choice
γ is high. Indeed average price volatility, trading volume and asset return
all exhibit U-shaped patterns with respect to γ.9
Both a lower and higher values of γ can lead to higher levels of price
9The U-shaped dependence on γ could cause issues in empirical estimations. Here
the knowledge of the funds’ strategies and the size of their wealth under management is
needed to decide whether one is in a low γ or a high γ regime.
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volatility and trading volume. The causes for these observed high price
volatility and trading volume can be quite different. To illustrate the drivers
behind the high price volatility and trading volume, Figure 1 depicts the time
series of the price of the risky asset and the funds’ wealth under management
when γ = 2, and Figure 2 does the same for γ = 8. When the value of γ is
relatively low (γ = 2), itchy-feet clients are less sensitive to the performance
of each fund type leading to a well diversified wealth distribution among the
three fund types. The low level of net flows of wealth which is implied by
the low value of γ serves as a macro level manifestation of the conservatism
bias of the itchy-feet clients. The scenario corresponds to that in the bottom
row of Table 3.
Figure 1 illustrates that for low intensities of choice (γ = 2) the wealth
managed by each of the three funds is almost equal. This can be interpreted
as a high degree of differences of opinion in the population of clients which,
in turn, entails high price volatility and trading volume.
When the intensity is high (γ = 8) clients’ are prone to herding which
can be viewed as less differences of opinion. Herding causes fluctuations of
funds’ wealth under management and thereby drives booms and crashes.
These findings reveal that not only a high degree of differences of opinion
but also herding with a lower degree of differences of opinion can cause high
price volatility and trading volume. This finding points to an alternative
explanation to the differences-of-opinion literature on explaining the high
trading volume observed in real markets.
Moreover, the differences-of-opinion literature usually ignores the evo-
lutionary perspectives of financial markets such as adaptation and market
selection. We have shown that, in a evolutionary context, excess fluctuations
of the price which are caused solely by differences of opinion (in terms of
different investment strategies or prior beliefs, different views in strategy se-
lections and different interpretations of the public performance measure) are
only a temporary market phenomenon. These differences of opinion are not
sufficient to explain the persistence of high trading volume, whereas addi-
tional insights can be obtained by analysing investors’ heuristics and biases
in strategy-switching. Our simulation results show that the high trading
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(a) Price of risky asset
(b) Proportion of wealth under management: fundamental value fund (red,
top), trend-chaser fund (green, middle), noise trader fund (blue, bottom)
Figure 1: Time series of funds’ wealth under management (in proportions
of total wealth) for recency bias (ρ = 0.99), all wealth freely flowing (β = 1)
and low intensity of choice (γ = 2).
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(a) Price of risky asset
(b) Proportion of wealth under management: fundamental value fund (red,
top), trend-chaser fund (green, middle), noise trader fund (blue, bottom)
Figure 2: High intensity of choice (γ = 8) in the scenario of Figure 1.
volume is triggered by differences of opinion and amplified by conservatism
bias or herding behaviour, while it is investors’ recency bias in performance
evaluation which maintains the persistence of differences of opinion and high
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trading volume.
To further illustrate how the values of the intensity of choice impact the
time series of log-returns of the risky asset, Table 5 collects the summary
statistics for 10 different scenarios with γ ranging from 1 to 10. For compar-
ison purpose, the path for the noise fund’s investment proportions and the
path for the dividends are fixed across all the scenarios. For each run, the
time series of log-returns are sampled over 10,000 periods after an initial 1
million periods.
γ Mean Max. Min. Std. dev
p-quantile
Skewness Kurtosis
p = 1% p = 99%
1 0.000020 0.3023 -0.2545 0.0683 -0.1675 0.1693 0.0453 3.4240
2 0.000019 0.2779 -0.2501 0.0636 -0.1561 0.1555 0.0434 3.3740
3 0.000018 0.2620 -0.2453 0.0600 -0.1480 0.1453 0.0392 3.3221
4 0.000016 0.2539 -0.2410 0.0573 -0.1389 0.1374 0.0323 3.2717
5 0.000015 0.2467 -0.2384 0.0554 -0.1349 0.1324 0.0267 3.2822
6 0.000014 0.4605 -0.2653 0.0545 -0.1331 0.1295 0.0895 4.2057
7 0.000012 0.6818 -0.3128 0.0557 -0.1388 0.1368 0.3969 8.7877
8 0.000011 1.1125 -0.3949 0.0594 -0.1459 0.1396 1.4351 30.8357
9 0.000014 1.2360 -0.4941 0.0630 -0.1665 0.1551 1.7602 36.0831
10 0.000008 0.9861 -1.2813 0.0643 -0.1718 0.1698 0.1880 40.4167
Table 5: Summary statistics for the time series of log-returns of the risky
asset (excluding dividend) under different values of intensity of choice γ.
Clients exhibit a mild recency bias, ρ = 0.99. β = 1.
Table 5 shows that increasing γ decreases the mean of log-returns (which
eventually goes to zero). In contrast, the magnitude of maximum and mini-
mum log-returns, standard deviations, the length between 1%-quantile and
99%-quantile, and kurtosis exhibit a U-shaped pattern with respect to γ.
The values of the 1%-quantile and the 99%-quantile show that 98% of re-
turns are bounded in mid ranges with a maximum interval between -17.18%
and 16.98%. These 98% of returns as well as the standard deviation of re-
turns are quite stable over the whole range of γ. However, huge booms and
crashes occur for higher values of γ as evidenced by the large maximum and
minimum returns. The extremely high kurtosis of returns in these cases im-
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plies that increasing γ increases the frequency of small returns (and reduces
that of high returns) but at the same time makes large price movements
more extreme.
The reason for this behaviour is as follows. If the intensity of choice is
relatively low, individual investors are not sensitive to the performance of
each fund type. The aggregate wealth is well diversified across the three
funds most of the time, which leaves some space for a volatile market since
the fundamental investment fund does not have a comparative advantage in
terms of relative wealth. If the intensity of choice is high, investors are sensi-
tive to the performance of each fund. From time to time, large price changes
trigger large shifts of wealth between the funds, and thereby induce further
price changes. These in turn feed back to more changes in funds’ wealth
shares. (This is illustrated in the insets in Figure 2 (a) and (b)). During
these periods, a highly volatile market with booms and crashes ensues. On
the other hand, the high intensity of choice also increases the average wealth
held in the fundamental investment fund (see Table 4 and Figure 2). This
leads to lone periods of time where the market is much less volatile.
Another important question is whether the effect of the intensity of
choice is proportional to the value of β (the proportion of the freely flowing
capital). To this end, we perform the same exercise as in Table 5 but with
β set to 1% (down from 100%). Table 6 depicts the summary statistics for
scenarios with relatively low and high values of γ.
γ Mean Max. Min. Std. dev
p-quantile
Skewness Kurtosis
p = 1% p = 99%
1 0.000021 0.2792 -0.2372 0.0643 -0.1559 0.1563 0.0420 3.3428
2 0.000021 0.2609 -0.2501 0.0597 -0.1443 0.1456 0.0437 3.3596
9 0.000019 0.2059 -0.2453 0.0419 -0.1028 0.1034 0.0484 3.4906
10 0.000019 0.2024 -0.1602 0.0404 -0.0997 0.0991 0.0489 3.5129
Table 6: Summary statistics for the time series of log-returns of the risky
asset (excluding dividend) under different values of intensity of choice γ.
Clients exhibit a mild recency bias, ρ = 0.99. β = 0.01.
Comparing the results in Tables 5 and 6 we find the following. When
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the value of the intensity of choice is low, reducing the value of β by a factor
of one-hundred only has a minor impact on the return series. The standard
deviation in both cases γ = 1 and γ = 2 drops only by 0.4%. Changes in
other the magnitude of the maximum and minimum returns, 1%-quantile
and 99%-quantile, skewness and kurtosis are also very small. In contrast, if
the intensity of choice is high, reducing the value of β substantially affects the
return series. Both skewness and kurtosis are much smaller in Table 6 than
in Table 5 for γ = 9 and γ = 10. The values for the 1% and 99% quantiles are
both closer to zero, and the extremely large booms and crashes disappeared.
Based on these results, we can conclude that the market is much more
sensitive to changes in the intensity of choice when the parameter β is large.
These findings show that in our model the intensity of choice has a pro-
nounced impact on the market dynamics when many investors have itchy
feet. But when the cool heads are much more numerous, the intensity of
choice has very little impact. This observation might be of interest to empiri-
cal researchers. For instance, Boswijk et al. [4] use S&P 500 data to estimate
the intensity of choice in an agent-based model. They find the existence of
two expectation regimes, one fundamentalist and one trend-following. But
the intensity of choice is not significantly different from zero. The authors
stress that this is a common result in type-switching regression models be-
cause large changes in the intensity of choice cause only small variations in
the wealth holdings of the different investment styles. Our model, in con-
trast, shows that the intensity of choice does have a strong impact – but
only if enough investors have itchy feet to generate a sufficient amount of
freely flowing capital. Moreover, based on the data of mutual fund flows,
statistically significant estimates of the intensity of choice parameter are
reported by Goldbaum and Mizrach [24].
4 Conclusion
The paper brings together two strands of literature, agent-based models
of financial markets where investment funds grow exogenously and evolu-
tionary finance where all growth is endogenous. By embedding the discrete
choice approach into an evolutionary finance framework, the resulting model
allows the coexistence of itchy-feet investors who tend to desert an under-
performing portfolio manager quickly and cool-head investors who would
stick with their portfolio manager even during long periods of poor perfor-
mance. The model separates the clients’ decision problem where to invest
their funds and the amount of capital that flows freely within a period in
time. If many investors have itchy feet, more capital will be reallocated but
if there are many cool heads, client attrition is low and less capital will move
in a period.
Numerical analysis of the model shows that a very small amount of freely
flowing capital can have a huge impact on the market dynamics if clients
exhibit recency bias in evaluating fund performance. In particular, even
with a mild degree of recency bias, the flow of funds is able to create an
evolutionary space where the investment strategies of fundamental trading,
trend chasing and the noise trading all survive in the long-run. Moreover, in
contrast to pure expectations-based type-switching models, the intensity of
clients’ choice is an important factor in driving excess volatility and extreme
price movements if enough investors have itchy feet.
The approach offers several directions for further research. We only look
at the standard one-asset-one-bond model, and we restrict our analysis to
3 decision rules. Further we exclude short-selling and long-leveraging. This
type of constraint is absent in most agent-based models of financial markets
which, in general, use borrowing as a main driver for excess volatility. Em-
pirical issues are not covered in the paper, and it might be interesting to see
how well a calibration can fit stock index dynamics in real markets.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let us first prove an auxiliary result.
Lemma A.1. Let A ∈ RI×K and B ∈ RK×I be non-negative matrices.
Suppose
(i)
∑I
i=1 Aik < 1 for all k = 1, ...,K; and
(ii)
∑K
k=1 Bki ≤ 1 for all i = 1, ..., I.
Then the matrix Id − AB is invertible and the inverse has only strictly
positive elements.
Proof. We show that C = Id−AB has a strict column-dominant diagonal:
I∑
j=1,j 6=i
|Cji| < Cii for all i = 1, ..., I. (18)
Then applying Murata [42, Corollary (p. 22) and Theorem 23 (p. 24)] yields
the assertion.
As
Cji = 1{i=j} −
K∑
k=1
AjkBki
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and AjkBki ≥ 0, (18) is equivalent to:
I∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
AjkBki < 1 for all i = 1, ..., I.
Indeed we find that the term on the left-hand side is bounded by
K∑
k=1
( I∑
j=1
Ajk
)
Bki <
K∑
k=1
Bki ≤ 1
where we first use assumption (i) and then (ii). 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Consider the system (5). We apply Lemma A.1
to show that the matrix
Id− (1− c)Θt
(
(1− β)Λt+1 + βΛt+1qt1
)
is invertible and that all elements of its inverse are strictly positive. Let
A = (1− c)Θt and B = (1− β)Λt+1 + βΛt+1qt1. Since c < 1, one has
I∑
i=1
Aik = 1− c < 1.
Further
K∑
k=1
Bki = (1− β)
K∑
k=1
λik + β
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
λikq
i ≤ 1− β + β = 1.
This gives the result because the non-negative vector
ΘtDt+1 + (1 + r)(1− c)∆λt,0
[
(1− β)Vt + βqt−11Vt
]
has at least one strictly positive entry. Indeed, by assumption, W it = (1 −
β)V it + βq
iV¯t > 0 and λ
i
t,k > 0 for all k ≥ 1. Therefore Θ
i
t,k > 0. Since
Dt+1,k ≥ 0 and
∑K
k=1 Dt+1,k > 0, we finally find
∑K
k=1 Θ
i
t,kDt+1,k > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Recall that the dividend process (Dt) is
stationary. Under the assumption of the proposition, the price dynamics (9)
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can be written as
Pt+1 = aPt + bDt+1 (19)
with a = a(c, r, λ) and b = b(c, r, λ) defined in (11). The price process
has an autoregressive form with a stationary sequence of innovations bDt+1.
Equation (19) has a unique stationary solution if |a| < 1 and the variance
of the innovation is finite. Since a is strictly decreasing in λ, setting λ = 0
one finds that a(c, r, 0) ≤ 1 if and only if c ≥ r/(1 + r). Also, a(c, r, 1) = 0,
hence, 0 ≤ a < 1. To verify that (10) is a stationary solution to (19), observe
that
P ∗t+1 = b
0∑
n=−∞
a−nDt+1+n = b
−1∑
n=−∞
a−nDt+1+n + bDt+1
= ab
0∑
n=−∞
a−nDt+n + bDt+1 = aP ∗t + bDt+1.
One has EP ∗t = b/(1− a)ED0 <∞ and P ∗t ≥ 0 (as Dt ≥ 0) therefore P ∗t is
finite a.s. Denoting v = V ar(P ∗t ) one obtains the relationship v = a2v+b2σ2
with a unique solution v = b2σ2/(1− a2).
Consider any price path Pt with P0 ≥ 0. Then
|Pt − P
∗
t | = a|Pt−1 − P
∗
t−1| = · · · = a
t|P0 − P
∗
0 |
which a.s. converges to zero as t→∞. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Rearranging equation (15) gives:
qit =
exp(γft)
I∑
i=1
exp(γft)
=
1
1 +
∑I
j 6=i exp[γ(f
j
t − f
i
t )]
. (20)
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Inserting (20) into sgn(qit+1 − q
i
t) gives:
sgn(qit+1 − q
i
t) = sgn
(
1
1 +
∑I
j 6=i exp[γ(f
j
t+1 − f
i
t+1)]
−
1
1 +
∑I
j 6=i exp[γ(f
j
t − f
i
t )]
)
= sgn
( I∑
j 6=i
exp[γ(f jt − f
i
t )]−
I∑
j 6=i
exp[γ(f jt+1 − f
i
t+1)]
)
= sgn
( I∑
j 6=i
[(f it+1 − f
i
t )− (f
j
t+1 − f
j
t )]
)
= sgn
( I∑
j 6=i
(∆it+1 −∆
j
t+1)
)
= sgn
(
I∆it+1 −
I∑
j=1
∆jt+1
)
. (21)
Since dividing I > 0 on the right-hand side of (21) does not change its sign,
one has
sgn(qit+1 − q
i
t) = sgn
(
∆it+1 −
∑I
j=1 ∆
j
t+1
I
)
. (22)
Finally, using ∆¯t+1 =
∑I
j=1 ∆
j
t+1 in (22) gives:
sgn(qit+1 − q
i
t) = sgn(∆
i
t+1 − ∆¯t+1).

B Calibration of dividend distribution
In the numerical analysis the dividends Dt are univariate and i.i.d. with
distribution N (µ, σ2)+ – the normal distribution truncated to non-negative
numbers. We shall show how to choose µ and σ so that the truncated
distribution has a given mean and variance.
Denote by φ+ the density of N (µ, σ
2)+. The probability that N (µ, σ2)
random variable takes values in the interval R++ is Φ(
∞−µ
σ
)−Φ(0−µ
σ
) with
Φ(·) the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
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tion. Therefore, using Bayes theorem the conditional density function is
given by
φ+(x) =
1
σ
φ(x−µ
σ
)
1− Φ(−µ
σ
)
=
1
σ
φ(x−µ
σ
)
Φ(µ
σ
)
, x ≥ 0,
where φ(x) = e
−
x
2
2√
2pi
is the probability distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. The expected value is obtained using the moment gen-
erating function M(τ) and equals
EDt =M
′(τ)|τ=0 = µ+ σ
φ(h)
Φ(−h)
(23)
with h = −µ
σ
. The variance is given by:
V arDt =M
′′(τ)|τ=0 − (M ′(τ)|τ=0)2 = σ2
[
1 +
hφ(h)
Φ(−h)
−
(
φ(h)
Φ(−h)
)2]
.
(24)
Rewriting the system of equations (23) and (24) gives:
EDt = µ+ σ
φ(h)
Φ(−h)
, σ2 = V arDt + EDt(EDt − µ). (25)
Inserting σ from the second equation into the first gives a non-linear equa-
tion for µ which we solved numerically. When the mean of Dt equals to
1 and the standard deviation is 20%, the corresponding parameters for
the truncated normal distribution are µ = 0.9999997026250630 and σ2 =
0.0400002973749369.
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